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The idea that real estate could have contributed to banking crises during the Great Depression 
has been downplayed due to the conservatism of mortgage contracts at the time. For instance, 
loan-to-value ratios often did not exceed 50 per cent. Using newly-discovered archival 
documents and data from 1934, this paper uncovers a darker side of 1920s US mortgage 
lending: the so-called ‘second mortgage system.’ As borrowers often could not make a 50 
percent down payment, a majority of them took second mortgages at usurious rates. As 
theory predicts, debt dilution, even in the presence of seniority rules, can be highly 
detrimental to both junior and senior lenders. The probability of default on first mortgages 
was likely to increase, and commercial banks were more likely to foreclose. Through 
foreclosure they would still be able to retrieve 50 percent of the property value, but often 
after a protracted foreclosure process. This would have put further strain on banks during 
liquidity crises. This paper is thus a timely reminder that second mortgages, or ‘piggyback 
loans’ as they are called today, can be hazardous to lenders and borrowers alike. It provides 
further empirical evidence that debt dilution can be detrimental to credit. 
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I Introduction
1
 
 
The recent financial crisis has reminded us of the impact that homeownership and mortgage 
finance can have on the economy. It has highlighted the complexity and many pitfalls of real 
estate lending for banking institutions. Perhaps for this reason, some have looked back at the 
U.S. Great Depression, examining possible parallels and emphasizing the occurrence of a real 
estate boom in the 1920s. Authors have convincingly shown, however, that real estate likely 
was not the main source of economic woes in the 1930s.
2
 Real estate played a smaller part in 
the economy, banks generally did not securitize their mortgages, and many of them 
(especially national ones) held very few real estate loans as a proportion of their assets.  
Nevertheless, insistence on the absolute safety of 1920s commercial bank mortgages 
would be misleading. While some have emphasized their surprisingly low loan-to-value 
ratios (usually only around 50 per cent) and their short maturities, their conservatism conceals 
some important, less well-known features. The aim of this paper is to examine those features, 
and argue that, perhaps paradoxically, these loans’ contractual characteristics contributed to 
increased default rates. While the paper does not draw explicit links between real estate 
lending and commercial bank failures, it suggests that it may have contributed to the severity 
of banking crises in the early 1930s.  
By inquiring whether borrowers could in practice make 50 per cent down payments, 
the paper uncovers the extent of the ‘second mortgage system’ (as it was called at the time), 
one of the most widespread – and yet least well-known – forms of debt dilution in recent 
economic history. While the negative effects of debt dilution are well documented in the 
theoretical literature, its prevalence in the 1920s U.S. commercial bank mortgage market is 
much less so. This is despite contemporaries, such as President Hoover, describing the second 
mortgage system as ‘the most backward segment of [the U.S.’s] whole credit system’.3 As 
few authors have analysed debt dilution empirically,
4
 this paper thus also provides further 
empirical support to the idea that debt dilution can be detrimental to credit. 
                                                          
1
 I am very grateful to my advisors Olivier Accominotti and Albrecht Ritschl for their continuous support and 
guidance. I would also like to thank Alex Field, Price Fishback, Andra Ghent, Jonathan Rose and participants at 
the 2012 Lisbon FRESH meeting and at the 2013 London EHES conference, the HEDG seminar at the 
University of Southern Denmark, and the 2014 History and Economics Conference at Yale University for useful 
comments or for sharing data with me. Funding from the Economic and Social Research Council is gratefully 
acknowledged. All errors are mine. 
2
 See, in particular, Field, ‘Interwar housing cycle’; and White, ‘Lessons.’ 
3
 J. M. Gries, and J. Ford, The President’s conference on home building and home ownership, called by 
President Hoover (Home Finance and Taxation. National Capital Press, Washington D.C., 1932)  available at 
http://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=wu.89047199922;view=1up;seq=7  
4
 See Degryse et al., ‘On the non-exclusivity’. 
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While borrowers were urged to ‘own their own homes’ in the early 1920s, banks on 
the other hand often would not lend more than half the price of the house. Borrowers were 
tempted to borrow from third parties (such as individuals or small second mortgage 
institutions) to help them make the high down payment. A second mortgage market 
flourished, benefiting more than 75 per cent of first-mortgage borrowers. In addition to the 
serious debt dilution problem it created for first mortgage lenders, the second mortgage 
system presented other aspects which only aggravated it. Indeed, second mortgage lenders 
charged exorbitant interest rates, and insisted that their loans be repaid before first mortgages 
and at more regular intervals. This meant that while second mortgages were junior before the 
law, they acquired a certain form of seniority in practice, putting repayments of first 
mortgages under further threat.  
The paper starts with a brief overview of existing models of debt dilution in the 
economics literature. Particular attention will be drawn to Bizer and DeMarzo’s model which 
analyses the negative impact of ‘sequential banking’ (the occurrence of borrowing from 
different lenders) on the first lender.
5
 While Fama and Miller suggest that sequential banking 
is not a problem in the presence of seniority rules,
6
 Bizer and DeMarzo effectively 
demonstrate that extra lending from a second bank creates an externality through the 
devaluation of prior debt which seniority rules cannot completely eliminate. In equilibrium, 
as first lenders anticipate the problem, interest rates end up higher on all debt, and so do 
probabilities of default.  
The paper then moves on to explain how high default rates on first mortgages could 
have mattered for commercial banks during the Depression (section III). Providing evidence 
of state banks’ exposure to real estate nationally in the 1920s, it emphasizes that while low 
loan-to-value ratios (LTVs) protected banks against significant losses, increased default rates 
likely put further strain on banks under certain circumstances – during bank runs in 
particular. This was due to long redemption periods allowed by state laws. 
Section IV provides contemporary evidence of the existence and extent of the second 
mortgage system. Information gathered from the National Association of Real Estate Boards 
archives and other contemporary sources allows me to establish that around 76 per cent of 
first mortgage borrowers resorted to this system, so that total mortgage debt was not 50 per 
cent of the value of the property but rather around 75 per cent, from two different lenders. I 
document average interest rates and amortization terms for both types of loans in most states 
                                                          
5
 Bizer and DeMarzo, ‘Sequential banking’. 
6
 Fama and Miller, Theory of finance. 
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Finally, Section V examines data on commercial bank mortgages made in 22 U.S. 
cities before the Depression started, and provides some evidence that low LTVs likely led to 
higher foreclosure rates in those cities. The data is taken from the Survey of Urban Housing 
published in 1937 by the Department of Commerce under the supervision of David L. 
Wickens. While it does not allow one to analyse each mortgage individually, it exploits 
variation in average LTVs and foreclosure rates on first mortgages between cities. The result 
is a strong negative correlation: the lower the loan-to-value ratio, the higher the probability of 
foreclosure. Although this result would be counter-intuitive to most observers today with no 
knowledge of second mortgages, the existence of the second mortgage system offers a 
plausible explanation. This section ends with contemporary descriptions of the problem, 
specifically highlighting the seniority-reversal effect.   
Section VI concludes that the Depression experience serves as an incentive for 
caution regarding the use of additional loans (such as ‘piggyback’ mortgages) whose debt 
dilution effects are difficult to mitigate. While in the 1930s increased default rates mainly 
mattered from a liquidity point of view, in the more recent crisis they also impaired banks’ 
capital.  
 
II Models of Debt Dilution 
 
Debt dilution is one of the central topics of contract theory. It is suspected to have played an 
important role in a number of financial crises, such as the Latin-American debt crisis of the 
1980s, the East Asian crisis of the late 1990s,
7
 and even the recent worldwide financial 
crisis.
8
 
To understand the phenomenon, consider Bizer and DeMarzo’s two-bank problem.9 
They begin by describing a situation where a borrower can only take loans from one bank. In 
this case, additional lending from that same bank imposes an externality on prior lending. 
Prior debt is ‘devalued’ as effort to pay back the first loan is proportionately reduced -- this is 
often referred to as straightforward debt dilution.  However the bank can internalise this 
externality by increasing the marginal price (interest rate) of each new loan, which 
compensates for the devaluation of prior debt.  
                                                          
7
 Bisin and Guaitoli, ‘Moral hazard’; Radelet and Sachs, ‘Onset.’ 
8
 See Acharya and Bisin, ‘Counterparty risk externality.’ 
9
 Bizer and DeMarzo, ‘Sequential banking.’ 
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This contrasts with a situation in which the borrower can take an additional loan not 
from the first bank, but from a second bank. In that case the first bank cannot compensate for 
the externality that the second loan imposes on its own prior debt by charging a higher rate on 
that second loan. Instead, in equilibrium, it charges a higher interest rate on its own original 
debt, which leads to a higher probability of default on that loan. Such a result is also found by 
Holmström and Tirole and more recently by Parlour and Rajan.
10
 
Fama and Miller initially suggested that a simple solution to this problem would be 
for each lender to be assigned a clear priority level in the bankruptcy process.
11
 According to 
this theory, seniority rules would reduce the first lender’s anxiety about possible debt dilution 
as he would be first in line to recover the borrower's assets in case of default. However since 
then a great number of authors have warned that seniority rules were no panacea, and that 
first lenders were still likely to modify their loan terms in equilibrium.
12
 
Such changes can include a rise in interest rates, as in the previous case. But first 
lenders can also ration credit, change the maturity of loans and make them shorter, or, in the 
case especially of sovereign debt, make their loans harder to restructure. The latter is 
described in a model by Bolton and Jeanne,
13
 where sovereign debt is described as 
excessively difficult to restructure in equilibrium, due to expectations of debt dilution. 
Shortening maturities is something that lenders to banks, in particular, resort to, according to 
Brunnermeier and Oehmke.
14
 By shortening the maturity of their loans junior lenders can 
become de facto senior; but this in turn leads first lenders to shorten the maturity of their own 
debt: thus a ‘maturity rat race’ is created.15 Finally, a number of authors point to credit 
rationing as a reaction to debt dilution.
16
 
Which of these reactions was commonest in the 1920s? We will see that while debt 
dilution increased the probability of foreclosure, the channels through which this occurred 
varied. In some cases it is possible to ask simply whether lenders could clearly anticipate all 
the possible risks attendant to second mortgage lending, including the seniority-reversal 
                                                          
10
 Holmström and Tirole, ‘Financial intermediation’; Parlour and Rajan, ‘Competition in loan contracts.’ 
11
 Fama and Miller, Theory of finance. 
12
 For example, it is possible that even if first lenders are able to recover 100% of their collateral in the event of 
default, there are still bankruptcy or foreclosure costs that they would prefer to avoid.  
13
 Bolton and Jeanne, ‘Structuring and restructuring.’ 
14
 Brunnermeier and Oehmke, ‘Maturity rat race.’ 
15
 Brunnermeier and Oehmke’s paper has wider implications than those directly linked to the debt dilution 
problem. Indeed, it questions the very efficiency of banks’ maturity mismatch, long heralded as a liquidity 
enhancer and a disciplining device (see Diamond and Dybvig, ‘Bank runs’; and Calomiris and Kahn, ‘Role of 
demandable debt’). It argues that bank debt may in fact be excessively short-term and thus inefficient. 
16
 See, in particular, Bennardo et al., ‘Multiple-bank lending’; Degryse et al., ‘On the non-exclusivity’; Kahn 
and Mookherjee, ‘Competition and incentives.’ 
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effect – to be described in Section V.17 In others, such as for mortgages made in 1928, it 
seems that interest rates are to blame. The possibility of credit rationing makes things even 
more complex, as in the 1920s the very reason for the existence of second mortgages was the 
small size of the original loans. This means that a negative feedback effect towards smaller 
and smaller loans cannot be excluded.  
Dilution models usually assume that the second loan is taken subsequently to the first. 
The 1920s case is probably unusual in that second mortgages, while junior in legal terms, 
were often recorded at the county register simultaneously with first mortgages (thus allowing 
borrowers to make their down payment).
18
 Debt dilution likely still occurred, however, as the 
first mortgage lender found himself in much the same situation as the first bank in Bizer and 
DeMarzo’s framework: expectations of reduced efforts on the part of borrowers to repay first 
loans would have led first lenders to compensate by changing the terms of their loans 
accordingly. In other words, first loan terms were likely stricter than if no second mortgages 
had been taken.  
Yet one may ask why banks would accept the very existence of second mortgages in 
the first place. Instead of imposing on themselves an inefficient two-lender equilibrium, they 
could have avoided it by offering a much higher loan-to-value ratio from the start. While the 
question should remain largely open, at least one explanation may be offered here. Quite 
possibly, banks prioritized credit risk and felt safer with very low LTVs. They expected some 
increased default risk but saw that low LTVs would allow them to incur very few losses. This 
view is in fact shared by some scholars today: how could mortgage foreclosures have 
mattered for banks in the 1920s, given such low LTVs?
19
 One of the aims of this paper is to 
suggest that high foreclosure rates could have mattered at least to some extent by reducing 
mortgages’ liquidity. While mortgages’ liquidity matters little in good times, its importance 
                                                          
17
 This would have created straightforward debt dilution whereby effort to pay back the first loan is reduced 
without full anticipation from the first lender (Bizer and DeMarzo, ‘Sequential banking’). See Section V for 
more detail.  
18
 All mortgages had to be recorded at the time they were taken. See Jones, Treatise, p. 343. A second mortgage 
covenant could even be included in case the second mortgage was due after the first and first lenders wanted to 
foreclose, with the risk of the second lender being entirely wiped out. In such cases, the covenant would allow 
second lenders to buy the first loan from the first lender and foreclose only on the second mortgage (see Reep, 
Second mortgages, p. 39). Such covenants must have rarely applied, however, given that most second mortgages 
matured before first mortgages (see Section IV).  
19
 This argument is put forward by both Field and White. See Field, ‘Interwar housing cycle’; and White, 
‘Lessons’. 
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increases during bank runs and financial panics. It is quite possible that lenders downplayed 
such risks (relative to credit risk) given the relatively low incidence of runs.
20
 
 
 
III Commercial Banks and the Real Estate Boom 
 
The fact that commercial banks could have suffered somewhat due to their real estate 
investments in the 1920s is not straightforward. First, the extent of the interwar real estate 
boom has only been studied recently, and some uncertainty remains as to its geographical 
scope. Nevertheless, some of the most recent research on the topic emphasises the broad 
national scope of the boom and finds popular accounts of the boom as confined to Florida and 
Chicago misleading. Using city-level data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics and Wickens’s 
Financial Survey of Urban Housing, Brocker and Hanes find construction and value patterns 
as consistent with a significant mid-1920s boom which varied across places.
21
 They suggest 
that the real estate boom and bust was not simply a side-effect of what was happening in the 
general economy and likely contributed to the severity of the depression.
22
 An indication of 
the size of the boom is given by Figure 1 which shows nonfarm housing starts nationally.  
 
<Figure 1 about here> 
 
Second, commercial banks were certainly not the only – indeed not even the main – 
lenders on real estate in the country at the time. Although their participation varied across 
cities, in many places building and loan associations (B&Ls), mutual savings banks, life 
insurance companies, mortgage companies and non-institutional lenders were more 
prevalent.
23
 In addition, national banks remained under very tight regulation with respect to 
mortgage lending until 1927. As a result their mortgage holdings only accounted for only 1.7 
per cent of their assets in 1926, at the peak of the boom.
24
  
                                                          
20
 Emphasis on credit risk rather than liquidity risk is visible in Reep, Second mortgages. See in particular, in the 
first chapter, ‘What is an adequate security?’ and ‘The 50 per cent margin an approximate adequate security’. 
See also Section III.  
21
 Their figures are generally corroborated by Fishback and Kollmann’s new series. See Fishback and Kollmann, 
‘New multicity estimates’. 
22
 Brocker and Hanes, ‘1920s American real estate boom’. 
23
 This has been documented thoroughly by Snowden, ‘Anatomy’. See also Grebler et al., Capital formation, 
Tables N-2 and N-3, pp. 468-74. These institutions are not analysed here as the topic of interest is the 
relationship (if any) between mortgage lending and bank distress. 
24
 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 1935-. All-Bank Statistics, United States, 1896-1955, 
available at https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/title/?id=39.. 
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However the importance of state-chartered banks in contributing to the mortgage 
boom should not be disregarded. A quick look at Figure 2 suggests that their real estate loans 
greatly increased in the 1920s, reaching a peak in 1926.
25
 Figure 3 shows that although many 
of their investments also increased in the period, the rise was largest for real estate loans. 
While the estimated
26
 data from All Bank Statistics do not allow one to distinguish farm from 
residential and commercial real estate, data on all Federal Reserve member banks indicates 
that in 1928 and 1929 the proportion of farm real estate to total real estate was only 16 per 
cent nationally.
27
 
 
<Figures 2 and 3 about here> 
 
The importance of state banks in participating in the real estate boom is emphasized 
by White, who remarks that mortgages came to account for 25 per cent of their total loan 
portfolios in 1926,
28
 and Eichengreen, whose work partly draws on contemporary accounts.
29
 
The latter notes that the ‘frenzied activity’ affecting Florida, Chicago, Detroit and New York 
City ‘would not have been possible without the enabling role of the banks’. Quoting Herbert 
Simpson in his 1933 article published in the American Economic Review:  
 
 (…) Real estate interests dominated the policies of many banks, and thousands 
of new banks were organized and chartered for the specific purpose of providing 
the credit facilities for proposed real estate promotions. The greater proportion 
were state banks and trust companies, many of them located in the outlying 
sections of larger cities or in suburban regions not fully occupied by older and 
more established banking institutions.
30
 
 
Finally, some might argue that commercial banks’ strict loan terms would have 
protected them from most economic shocks. For instance, until 1927 national banks were 
                                                          
25
 The figures provided here and in Figure 1 may take renewals into account. 
26
 The data are estimated and therefore imperfect. This may especially be so for residential real estate loans held 
by state-chartered banks.  
27
 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Banking and monetary statistics. Note that Federal 
Reserve members did not have to follow any specific regulations on mortgage lending, although some of them 
were of course national banks and had to follow national banking law. 
28
 White, ‘Lessons’. See also Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, All bank statistics. In the same 
year national banks’ real estate loans only amounted to 5.4% of their assets. 
29
 Eichengreen, Hall of mirrors.  
30
 Simpson, ‘Real estate speculation’. 
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only allowed to make city mortgages for a maturity of up to one year, and when in 1927 they 
were finally allowed to make 5-year, renewable mortgages, their loan-to-value ratios could 
not exceed 50 per cent.
31
 Regulations were much less strict for state banks, except for some 
states, but by custom they generally would not allow their LTVs to rise much higher.
32
 
This conservatism can partly be explained by a customary insistence on credit risk.
33
 
It can also be explained by generous redemption laws.
34
 Indeed, when the allowed 
redemption period was particularly lengthy, court fees and property deterioration could 
increase banks’ losses. Variation in redemption laws and LTVs by state helps to see this. 
                                                          
31
 The National Banking Act of 1864, whose aim was partly to bring banks under the control of the federal 
government and thereby to set standards of good practice, prohibited any type of lending on real estate (see 
White, Regulation and reform). Under the Federal Reserve Act of 1913, conditions were slightly liberalized for 
country national banks so as to allow them to make farm mortgages for a duration of up to 5 years, which could 
not exceed 25% of capital and surplus or a third of time deposits (United States, Federal Reserve Act, p. 25). In 
September 1916, this act was amended to allow urban banks to make real estate loans of up to one year, though 
excluding banks located in central reserve cities (Chicago, New York and St Louis) (see Federal Reserve Board, 
Index-Digest, p. 44). It is only after the passage of the McFadden Act in 1927 that all national banks were 
allowed to loan on real estate for 5 years, to an aggregate amount of 50% of their time deposits (see Lloyd, 
‘Government-induced market failure’). Much of this liberalization was due to an effort on the part of the 
national banking system to compete with state banks (see U.S. Congress, 68
th
 Congress, Inquiry on Membership 
pursuant to Act No. 503 (1926b, p. 13) and U.S. Congress, 69
th
 Congress, 1
st
 Ses., Hearings on S.1782 and H.R. 
2 (1926a), p. 25). It is also interesting to note that Mr Bains of the National Bank of Philadelphia remarked that 
one reason why state banks might still be reluctant to adopt national charters was that they could not rediscount 
real estate paper at the Federal Reserve Banks: ‘You take the State banks: the principal loans are on real estate. 
That may be why so many State banks do not want to go into the national system, because they have no use of 
the rediscount privileges. They can get rediscount from their correspondent banks, but not from the Federal 
Reserve bank, because most of their bonds are on real estate; that is, in Pennsylvania’. (U.S. Congress, 68th 
Congress, Inquiry on Membership pursuant to Act No. 503 (1926), p. 644). 
32
 The only precise data available on state-chartered bank legislation comes from Welldon (Digest of state 
banking statutes), although this 1910 source should be a rather conservative one as real estate regulation had a 
tendency to become more lax in the following decades. According to this survey, only Michigan, Minnesota, 
North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon and Texas limited loan-to-value ratios to 50%. According to Morton (Urban 
mortgage lending, pp. 3-7, 178), the contract maturity of first mortgage loans rarely exceeded five years, and 
often only averaging three years. Most only required interest payments, with the principal payable at maturity in 
a ‘balloon’ payment. Since these figures are based on a National Bureau of Economic Research survey of urban 
mortgage lending, their absolute precision may be taken with care. The survey was made in 1945 on a sample of 
170 commercial banks, ‘representing about one-third of the commercial banks' total nonfarm mortgage portfolio 
as of mid-1945’. It included ‘commercial banks… of all sizes’ (ibid., p. 71). However numerous contemporary 
sources confirm these estimations: see for instance NAREB, Real Estate Finance (hereafter REF), Adair, 
‘Housing loans’ and Gries and Ford, President’s conference, pp. 6, 16, 20 (see also Section IV). This contract 
differed from, say, B&L contracts whose mortgages were amortized over 11 years on average. It would be 
useful to see how this difference in contracts impacted these institutions’ chances of survival during the 
Depression, but B&Ls are known to have suffered from other structural problems with their share participation 
system which would make a comparison with commercial banks particularly difficult (see, in particular, 
Snowden, ‘Anatomy’). 
33
 Reep, in Second mortgages, indeed referred to a ‘custom’ that ‘has become so deeply entrenched’. From 
Reep’s first chapter it is clear that the main type of risk considered by lenders is credit risk, not liquidity risk 
(see in particular ‘What is an adequate security?’ and ‘The 50 per cent margin an approximate adequate 
security.’) A neat table on p. 10 explains how different factors can lead to loss of value, and why 50% is a very 
good limit: variation in appraisal (-10%); instability of value (-5%); obsolescence and depreciation (-10%); 
changes in occupancy and use (-5%); foreclosure and forced sale (-5%); commission for selling (-5%), financial 
depression (-5%). 
34
 The redemption period is the period during which borrowers may reclaim title to the property by paying down 
the debt. The general point is also made by Reeve, ‘New proposal’. 
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While the average commercial bank LTV was indeed around 50 per cent, there is some 
interesting variation across states. Redemption laws also varied, as Table 1 makes clear.
35
 
And there is indeed a modest negative correlation (around .5) between the number of months 
allowed for redemption and LTVs. In other words, the more generous state laws were 
towards borrowers, the more likely banks were to reduce their mortgage loan amounts.  
 
<Table 1 about here> 
 
In spite of this conservatism, it is worth noting that a rise in default rates would not have left 
banks unscathed under all circumstances. A liquidity shock, for instance, – such as a series of 
bank runs – could heighten the importance of borrowers’ cash flow for banks. Good 
mortgages could neither be sold in secondary markets nor rediscounted at the Federal 
Reserve. If default rates rose, banks would be protected against significant losses thanks to 
their low LTVs.
36
 Yet long redemption periods entailed increased liquidity risk as banks 
would struggle to transform properties into cash.  
It is well-known that most commercial banks came under severe liquidity pressure in 
the early 1930s. Friedman and Schwartz and others provide evidence of this phenomenon, an 
indication of which is given by Figure 4.
37
 The fact that increased default risk would have 
caused further distress is illustrated by this quote from the vice-president of the First National 
Trust and Savings Bank in Chicago in 1932: 
 
As to retaining homes, I have heard a lot of talk about foreclosures and that the 
banks are calling loans and insisting upon repayment and that the borrowers are 
unable to refund elsewhere, and they are doing this because they are trying to keep 
their assets liquid. In our State it takes us, at a minimum, 18 months to foreclose a 
loan, and it will probably be closer to two years, if not two years and a half, before 
                                                          
35
 More detailed information including foreclosure type and court time is available in Table S.1.  
36
 Brocker and Hanes find that owner-occupied home values fell from 20 to 48% during 1930-34. The only city 
where values fell by more was Wichita Falls, Texas (see Brocker and Hanes, ‘1920s American real estate 
boom’). Fishback and Kollmann, computing new indices of home values, find similar results: property values 
came to a peak somewhere between 1926 and 1930 and fell from 20 to 30% on average (see Fishback and 
Kollmann, ‘New multicity estimates’). See also Postel-Vinay, ‘What Caused Chicago Bank Failures?’. 
37
 Friedman and Schwartz, Monetary history; Wicker, Banking panics. See also Richardson, ‘Categories and 
causes’. Figure 4 can nevertheless be difficult to interpret due to the high number of bank failures in the early 
1930s.  
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we acquire title. We are certainly not maintaining our liquid condition by 
foreclosing loans. We cannot do anything with it after we get it foreclosed.
38
 
 
<Figure 4 about here> 
 
If second mortgages led to a rise in foreclosure risk on first mortgages made by banks, 
therefore, it is likely that liquidity crises would have become more severe. The next section 
discusses what can be learned about the second mortgage system. 
 
IV The second mortgage system 
 
In the depth of the Depression, President Hoover convened 25 committees to work for a 
number of months on the problems facing mortgage borrowers and lenders. The Committee 
on Finance for the Conference then drew conclusions that two years later would form the 
basis of the justification for the National Housing Act. One of these conclusions was that the 
frequent 50 per cent limit on first mortgages was based on erroneous principles: ‘If security is 
considered, this would seem to be in line with sound public policy. On the other hand, the 
practice is the principle cause for most second mortgages with their exorbitant rates and 
frequent failures.’39 
As a result the bill for the National Housing Act was specifically designed, among other 
things, ‘to eliminate the necessity for costly second-mortgage financing.’40 This necessity 
was best described by Reep in his 1928 book on second mortgages: 
 
The chief financing problem (...) is that of financing above the first mortgage. (...) In 
purchasing a property (...) it is assumed, of course, that at least a small down 
payment is made. The difference between the sum of the first mortgage plus the 
down payment and the total cost of the property must be financed by junior liens. If 
the cost of the property is $10,000, the purchase money mortgage $5,000, and the 
down payment $2,500, then the balance, $2,500, is the junior lien.
41
 
 
                                                          
38
 U.S. Congress, 72
nd
 Congress, 1
st
 Ses., Hearings on S.2959 (1932), part 2, p. 269.  
39
 Gries and Ford, President’s conference, p. ix. 
40
 U.S. Congress, 73
rd
 Congress, 2
nd
 Ses., Hearings on S.3603 (1934), p. 1. 
41
 Reep, Second mortgages, p. 1. 
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But what proportion of borrowers took on a second mortgage in addition to the first? And 
what was its average loan-to-value ratio? Unfortunately, the extant quantitative data on the 
topic is scarce, probably due to the fact that most second mortgage lenders were lightly 
supervised non-institutional lenders or second mortgage companies.
42
 Nevertheless, a number 
of contemporary sources can help draw a plausible picture of the situation. The National 
Association of Realtors Archives in Chicago for instance contain extensive archival material 
on the second mortgage system.
43
 Most of the material consists in valuable survey or 
qualitative information, as in the numerous contemporary research articles from the 
Association’s Real Estate Finance journal and thousands of news items from its National 
Real Estate Journal from which many of the references cited in this section and the next are 
drawn.  
Before the Depression, only one statistical inquiry was carried out by the Mortgage and 
Finance division of the Association, in 1923. It mainly consisted of survey data based on 
questionnaires sent to about 200 urban banking institutions which were members of the 
Association.
44
 The survey indicates that 76 per cent of first residential mortgage borrowers 
took on a second mortgage. While this is only survey data, a separate survey was carried out 
by the above mentioned Committee on Finance in 1931-32, yielding similar results. Gries and 
Ford indeed noted that ‘two-thirds or more of all home purchase transactions require junior 
financing.’45 In the Association’s survey, the average loan-to-value ratio for second 
mortgages was 29.6 per cent, so that the total average ratio for first and second mortgages 
combined was 83.3 per cent. Gries and Ford as well as other contemporary sources put the 
combined LTV lower, at 75 per cent.
46
 NAREB documents also indicate that most loans 
lasted on average one to three years, so that they usually matured before the first mortgage.
47
 
                                                          
42
 Gries and Ford, President’s conference.  
43
 This trade association of realtors still exists but at the time was called the National Association of Real Estate 
Boards (NAREB). In the field of mortgage finance their aim was to capture contemporary trends, describe and 
explain them, and to some extent warn against them if they thought they could constitute a threat to business in 
the long run. They often asked outside observers (businessmen as well as academics) to contribute to their 
research output. The second mortgage system was one of the chief examples of ‘bad practice’ that many 
contributors criticized. 
44
 It therefore excludes B&Ls. The exact source is: National Association of Real Estate Boards Archives 
(hereafter NAREB), ‘Financing the American home’. See NAREB, REF, Reep, ‘Problem’, which provides 
further details on the study.  
45
 See Gries and Ford, President’s conference, p.21. See also, for example, NAREB, REF, Adair, ‘Housing 
loans’. 
46
 NAREB, REF, Beach, ‘Financing’. See also Gries and Ford, President’s conference. 
47
 See, in particular, NAREB, REF, Dunton, ‘Cost of financing’, pp.172-3. See also Gries and Ford, President’s 
conference, p. 20 (‘Second mortgages usually run for shorter periods, one to three years being the commonest’). 
Gries and Ford note that sometimes the first mortgage matured before the second, but they present this fact more 
as an oddity than common practice. 
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Also contrasting with first mortgages, second liens were not expected to be renewed, and 
required monthly amortized payments.
48
 Table 2 summarizes these findings. 
 
<Table 2 about here> 
 
The prevalence of very high interest rates and charges – on average 14 to 16 per cent 
for second mortgages on homes – can be explained in part by the underdevelopment of large 
institutions making second mortgages. As Bayless and Bodfish put it, ‘the majority of second 
mortgage business is carried on by small firms and individuals, which prevents the operation 
of the insurance principle through the spreading of risk’.49 Drawing on 1925 data for 
Chicago, Bayless and Bodfish described the second mortgage as a rather sound instrument 
since it only lasted one to three years, there was no intention of renewal, and it required 
monthly principal payments.
50
 They also asserted that it ‘has broadened the real estate market 
and has often been the financial ladder by which the urban tenant climbs to complete 
ownership.’ However they did recognize a ‘complete lack of standardization’, emphasizing 
particularly high interest charges.  
Yet the most important reason behind these high interest rates was the lack of security 
backing the second mortgage and the resulting ‘discounting business’. As liens were junior 
they were by definition hazardous for the lender – so much so that charging the maximum 
legal rate would not be enough to cover the risks attendant to second mortgages. As charging 
a usurious rate would bring disrepute to the firm or individual offering the loan, they would 
in turn sell it to a third party, at a discount. This would render the transaction between 
borrower and investor legal.
51
 The third party would then charge an even higher rate to the 
                                                          
48
 NAREB, National Real Estate Journal (hereafter NREJ), Brigham, ‘Junior financing’.  Regarding second 
liens, he noted: ‘one of the commonest sharp tricks is to sell a man a house for more than it is worth with a small 
down payment and a one-year second mortgage which at the end of the year the seller mortgagee says that he 
cannot renew in spite of his assurances to the contrary at the time of sale’. See also Bayless and Bodfish, 
‘Costs’; NAREB, REF, Beach, ‘Financing’; Gries and Ford, President’s conference, pp. 6, 20.   
49
 Bayless and Bodfish, ‘Costs’. Gries and Ford mentioned the existence of ‘second mortgage companies’, the 
great majority of which failed to weather the Depression (President’s conference, p. 29).  
50
 Bayless and Bodfish, ‘Costs’. According to their survey, based on a small sample of properties in Chicago, 
about half of homes, and around two thirds of apartments, were encumbered with a second mortgage in 1925 
(ibid.). 
51
 As Reep put it, ‘instead of financing the borrower direct, the lender will purchase the second mortgage and 
land contract paper if it has been executed. This procedure is not affected by usury law because any man has the 
right to sell his mortgage or his contract at any rate of discount (...) provided that the mortgage or contract is not 
already tainted with usury in the hands of the seller’. (See Reep, Second mortgages, p. 19) Further detail can be 
found in NAREB, REF, Reep, ‘Financing above the first mortgage’, where the author insisted that ‘second 
mortgages are bought at a discount and are not made directly with the owner of the property’, and the following 
example is provided: ‘[t]he seller can take this second mortgage to a second mortgage company and discount it 
$500 and thereby realize his $5,000 cash for the property as follows: $1,500 cash from the purchaser, $2,500 in 
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borrower to compensate for the commission it had to pay the dealer.
52
 In other words, 
through the discounting business the borrower ended up paying a higher rate than the already 
usurious rate he would pay without it. Consequently many contemporary observers, including 
Reep, criticized usury legislation itself and supported higher statutory maximums. Table S.2 
provides information on legal rates (the default interest rate suggested by law) and statutory 
maximums (the actual maximum rate banks are allowed to charge by law). 
To what extent was this discounting business established? According to Reep, the 
discounting of second mortgage paper was carried out in most U.S. cities for most second 
mortgages.
53
 In this regard it is interesting to note that a small portion of second mortgages 
were in fact pooled with others and sold to banks and investors as securities. Such securities 
were the direct obligation of the issuing company. But as Beach made clear, this practice had 
yet to become more common and better known.
54
  
These interest rates were often blamed for borrowers’ inability to pay back their 
second mortgages. Consequently, most lenders specializing in second mortgages went 
bankrupt in the Depression. As Fahey pointed out in his 1934 article, the mortality rate of 
second mortgages was ‘practically 100 per cent’.55 
 
 
V Consequences for Commercial Banks 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
cash from the first mortgage and $1,000 cash from the discounted $1,500 second mortgage. In fact, the seller 
can discount the $1,500 second mortgage any amount that he wishes or even give it away without any danger of 
usury’. 
52
 Reep, Second mortgages. This was also explained by Beach: ‘The individual investor, fearing that he had 
more hazard and knowing that he had more trouble demanded a large profit. The dealer wanted a profit too. The 
borrower paid both - two profits - both large’. (see NAREB, REF, Beach, ‘Financing’.) 
53
 Reep, Second mortgages, p. 86.  
54
 NAREB, REF, Beach, ‘Financing’, p. 13. Reep also provided an interesting account of what has survived 
today in the literature on building and loan associations (B&Ls) as the ‘Philadelphia experiment’. It is often 
described as a relatively rare form of innovative behaviour on the part of B&Ls, in which some Philadelphia 
B&Ls started specializing in the second mortgage business in what seemed at first sight an attempt to reap a 
larger profit (see Loucks, ‘Philadelphia plan’ and Snowden, ‘Anatomy’). Reep’s account provided additional 
information in explaining why even first mortgage borrowers who were B&L members also needed access to 
the second mortgage market. He conceded that B&Ls’ monthly amortization principle allowed them to make 
first mortgages about 15% higher ‘with equal safety’ (ibid., p. 90). However for him, 65% LTVs had not solved 
the junior lien problem as ‘they have merely limited the problem to a narrower margin of security’. Indeed, 
many borrowers still could not make a 35% down payment and still needed to take out a second mortgage (ibid., 
p. 92). But Reep was quite pessimistic about the future of B&Ls in this business as he thought they would in the 
end face similar constraints as other second mortgage dealers (ibid., p. 100). 
55
 Federal Home Loan Bank Board, Federal Home Loan Bank Review (1934). See also NAREB, NREJ, Cope 
(1929). 
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In this section I analyse data on commercial bank first mortgages drawing from the 
Department of Commerce’s 1937 Financial Survey of Urban Housing conducted under the 
direction of David L. Wickens.
56
 The aim of this analysis is to determine the extent to which 
second mortgages might have increased default risk on first mortgages made by commercial 
banks. This survey has many flaws. To start with, it was conducted in January 1934, long 
after the Depression started, and after most second mortgages made in the 1920s had been 
paid off or foreclosed – so that it contains no adequate second mortgage data.57 It is 
retrospective – surveyors asked mortgage holders about the value of their house when they 
bought it; they did not look at mortgage contracts themselves. Finally, data is missing for 
some cities where commercial banks were minor lenders. Nevertheless, to my knowledge this 
survey provides the most elaborate and detailed data on first mortgages made by commercial 
banks prior to the Depression. For 22 ‘representative’ U.S. cities,58 most of which had a 
population of over 100,000 souls, information was gathered on 1 January 1934 on existing 
owner-occupied residential properties, whether mortgaged by a commercial bank, not 
mortgaged or undergoing foreclosure.
59
  
While Section IV made clear that LTVs on such mortgages rarely exceeded 50 or 55 
per cent, Table 1 also showed that there was some geographical variation in LTVs. Such 
variation can be exploited to determine whether particularly low LTVs led to higher 
foreclosure rates. To this end the most important items of the survey were, in each city: 1) the 
average cost of properties by year of acquisition (whether acquired through debt or bought 
outright); 2) the average value of properties acquired in 1926 on January 1st, 1934; 3) the 
average original amount of existing first mortgages; 4) the average percentage of existing 
first mortgages undergoing foreclosure; 5) the average amount of existing first mortgages by 
                                                          
56
 The data in raw form can be accessed online at http://catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/00110677. 
57
 In addition, the existing data on second mortgages cannot be used for this study as it does not provide 
information on second mortgages taken to specifically complement first mortgages made by commercial banks. 
In other words the data are bundled up with other data on second mortgages taken to complement first mortgage 
loans made by B&Ls and other lenders, who in many cases offered higher first mortgage LTVs than banks.  
58
 The cities included are: Portland, Maine; Worcester, Mass.; Providence, R.I.; Syracuse, N.Y.; Trenton, N.J.; 
Cleveland, Ohio; Indianapolis, Ind.; Peoria, Ill.; Minneapolis, Minn.; Des Moines, Iowa; Wichita, Kans.; 
Richmond, Va.; Wheeling, W. Va.; Atlanta, Ga.; Birmingham, Ala.; Oklahoma City, Okla.; Dallas, Tex.; Butte, 
Mont.; Casper, Wyo.; Salt Lake City, Utah; Seattle, Wash.; San Diego, Calif. 
59
 Another potentially useful source is the data collected by the NBER in 1945 mentioned earlier. However, as 
was pointed out, and as Morton himself insists, the foreclosure data from this source are likely to be fraught with 
errors since many banks declined to fill out the questionnaire and many others may have been dishonest about 
their foreclosure experience (see Morton, Urban mortgage lending, pp. 133-8). In this respect Wickens’s data 
are more reliable, being closer to the Depression and surveying individual properties instead of individual banks, 
which avoids the self-selection problem. 
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year loan made or renewed; and 6) the average contract interest rates on existing first 
mortgages.
60
 
Unfortunately there was no ready-made LTV variable for first mortgages made by 
commercial banks by year loan made. Instead I had to construct such an average LTV 
variable by dividing (5) by (1) for each year before the Depression.
61
 As the foreclosure rates 
concern only first mortgage loans still existing on 1 January 1934 – with no breakdown by 
year loan made – it was important to find out the most likely contracting dates for those 
existing loans. This would allow the study of relationships between foreclosure rates and 
LTVs of loans made roughly in the same years. Correlations included in Figure S.3 show that 
most existing loans were made in 1927 and 1928, which induces me to focus on those two 
years. This should not be an issue as the peak in residential construction was reached in 1926 
and mortgage lending plateaued around 1927 (see Figure 1).  
Figures 5 and 6 show correlations between LTVs on first mortgage loans made by 
commercial banks and foreclosure rates on those loans. In both 1927 and 1928, the 
correlation is strong and negative; in other words, the lower the LTV on these loans, the 
higher was their foreclosure rate. The existence of the second mortgage system could at first 
sight offer a plausible explanation for these results: it is likely that the lower the LTV on the 
first mortgage was, the larger was the second mortgage loan, and the greater was the debt 
dilution problem. 
 
<Figures 5 and 6 about here> 
 
While most banks would rather give smaller loans to lower-income borrowers due to 
the increased credit risk, in practice the reverse usually occurs due to borrower cash 
constraints.
62
 In general, therefore, lower LTVs are given to higher-income borrowers, which 
                                                          
60
 The exact tables from which the numbers are drawn can be found as follows: 1) Table 3 (dividing total cost by 
number reporting); 2) Table 3 (also dividing total value by number reporting); 3) Table 36; 4) Table 36 
(‘Percent with foreclosure started’); 5) Table 48; 6) Table 37.  
61
 This average is thus a ratio of means rather than a mean of ratios. While this may at first strike as odd, it 
should be noted that the arithmetic mean of ratios is only superior to the ratio of arithmetic means if both the 
numerator and denominator are normally distributed. This assumption, however, can be questioned in the case 
of many financial variables, which often display lognormal distributions. In such cases, the ratio of arithmetic 
means in fact approximates the geometric mean of the ratios, which is considered a better estimate than the 
arithmetic mean of the ratios (see, in particular, Lev and Sunder, ‘Methodological issues’; McLeay and 
Triguiros, ‘Proportionate growth’; and Tippett, ‘Induced theory’). However in this dataset a few resulting LTVs 
are unexpectedly high, which may suggest that the presence of some measurement error cannot be definitely 
excluded. 
62
 Von Furstenberg, ‘Default risk’. 
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combined with the higher home equity effect usually entails lower default risks.
63
 This 
explains why most observers today with no knowledge of the second mortgage system would 
find the negative relationship counter-intuitive.  
Nevertheless the existence of the second mortgage system changes some of these 
assumptions. Banks willing to give smaller loans to lower-income borrowers would be able to 
do so. Indeed, lower-income borrowers’ cash constraints would be reduced thanks to the 
availability of second mortgage money. It is therefore possible that the negative relationship 
present in Figures 5 and 6 can simply be explained by the fact that lenders lent lower amounts 
to riskier borrowers, rather than by any debt dilution effect.  
Unfortunately it is not possible to directly observe borrower characteristics with the 
extant data. Yet one can make use of Wickens’s statistics on owner-occupied dwellings, 
which report 1929 – pre-Depression – homeowner income.64 While this variable includes all 
homeowners including those free of mortgage, it is notable that in 1933 mortgaged and non-
mortgaged homeowners were similarly distributed across income groups, suggesting that this 
variable may be a good approximation of pre-Depression borrower income (see Figure S.4).
65
 
Figure 7 reports this statistic by city along with LTVs in 1927 and 1928. A quick perusal 
suggests that lower LTVs were associated, if anything, with higher income.
66
 
 
<Figure 7 about here> 
 
It is nevertheless worth examining falls in property values, which may also be an 
indication of borrower quality. Figure 8 reports the fall in property values from 1926 to 1 
January 1934 along with LTVs.
67
 It shows that lower LTVs were associated with larger 
declines in property values.  This could indeed suggest that smaller loans were given to 
                                                          
63
 Lower home equity increases the chances that borrowers find themselves ‘underwater’ and thus default on 
their loans. For a survey of the literature, see Quercia and Stegman, ‘Residential mortgage default’. 
64
 See Table 20 in the survey. 
65
 Figure S.4, drawn from Table 18 for each city, shows the distribution of homeowners (mortgaged and free of 
mortgage) across income groups in 1933. It reveals that the distribution was similar for the two groups. 
Assuming (reasonably) that income distributions did not change much over time, the average 1929 income data 
used in Figure 7 may be seen as representative of borrowers’ average income then. Figure 13 in the Appendix 
provides further support to this reasoning, by showing a strongly positive correlation between average borrower 
income in 1933 and all homeowner income in 1929. Average 1933 borrower income was calculated from the 
data in Figure 12, using midpoints for each income interval (Wickens does not provide us with direct average 
borrower income data, only interval data).  
66
 Note that there is no clear indication, either in contemporary or more recent sources, that commercial banks 
catered to higher-income individuals than other institutional lenders such as B&Ls and mortgage companies. 
Therefore the relationship between all homeowner income and LTVs should be relatively unbiased.  
67
 This was computed using the average cost of properties acquired in 1926 and the average 1934 value of 
properties acquired in 1926. 
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lower-quality borrowers, although this association could be the result of lower LTVs leading 
to larger second mortgages, higher foreclosure rates, and in turn greater falls in property 
values (Figure 9 suggests this possibility by showing that high foreclosure rates were 
associated with larger falls in property values).  
 
<Figures 8 and 9 about here> 
 
As Figures 7 and 8 present mixed evidence of the possibility that high foreclosure 
rates were driven by low borrower quality, it seems necessary to introduce a regression model 
which would help control for these possible borrower quality effects.  Although the survey 
sample size is very small (n≤22), one may conduct simple ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regressions with no more than two regressors each time, thus respecting the usual rule of 
thumb. It should then be possible to see whether lower LTVs had an impact on foreclosure 
rates, controlling for borrower quality using proxies. The data on 1929 homeowner income 
(income), as well as declines in property values (valuefall) are therefore included. If low 
LTVs mainly reflected lenders’ predictions of larger falls in land values due to lower 
borrower quality, one would expect LTVs’ explanatory power to disappear somewhat with 
the inclusion of income or valuefall. One can thus estimate the following base model: 
 
 
foreclosurerate  =  α  +  β1 LTV1927  +  ε (1) 
 
 
where the dependent variable, foreclosurerate, is the rate of foreclosure on existing 
mortgages made by commercial banks, LTV1927 (LTV1928) is the loan-to-value ratio on 
1927(1928) loans, with income and valuefall separately entering the regression. Table 3 
reports results for each of the six models. Despite the small sample size, Figure 14 in the 
Appendix suggests that the residuals in each regression are approximately normal, supporting 
the relative validity of p-values.  
The results suggest that lower LTVs tended to lead to higher foreclosure rates 
regardless of pre-Depression income (models 1, 2, 4 and 5). For instance, controlling for 
income, a one percentage point increase in 1927 LTVs led foreclosure rates to decline by .10 
percentage points. Further evidence is provided by the inclusion of valuefall: its inclusion in 
the regression does little to alter the basic results (models 3 and 6). This would tend to 
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suggest that second mortgages offer a plausible explanation for the relationship between low 
LTVs and high foreclosure rates. 
 
<Table 3 about here> 
 
Now, as was seen previously, the precise channels through which second mortgages 
could have led to higher foreclosure rates on first mortgages are of various kinds. All that can 
be said given the available data is that, on average, interest rates were not the obvious 
problem in 1927, whereas they may have been in 1928. Figure 10 helps to see this, plotting 
average LTVs against average interest rates on first mortgages for both years. In 1928, there 
is a strong negative correlation between LTVs and interest rates: the lower the LTV, the 
higher the interest rate. But the correlation is much weaker for 1927, which suggests an 
unstable relationship between the two. This could mean that foreclosures increased due to 
other kinds of modifications of the first mortgage loan contracts, or that first mortgage 
lenders suffered from ‘straightforward’ debt dilution due to a lack of anticipation of all the 
possible risks attendant to second mortgage lending.
68
 
 
<Figure 10 about here> 
 
One such risk possibly arose from differences in contract terms between first and 
second mortgages which would aggravate the situation by creating a seniority-reversal effect. 
Since interest rates on second mortgages were usurious, and since the latter matured in 
general before the former (see again Table 2), the second mortgage acquired some priority in 
time – what is sometimes called de facto priority.69 This seniority-reversal effect was 
reinforced when second mortgages required monthly principal payments, unlike first 
mortgages which usually remained unamortized. As Schmidt remarked in 1930: 
 
Experience proves that it is better and safer to have one mortgage for seventy per 
cent than to have, say, a fifty per cent first mortgage and junior financing above 
that amount. The expense of the junior financing is very great, and such second 
                                                          
68
 ‘Straightforward debt dilution’ occurs when effort to pay back the first loan is reduced without full 
anticipation from the first lender (see Bizer and DeMarzo, ‘Sequential banking’). See also Section II. 
69
 Brunnermeier and Oehmke, ‘Maturity rat race’. 
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and third mortgages, because of heavy amortization and other causes, have been 
frequently the occasion of leading a first mortgage issue into difficulty.
70
 
  
Adams likewise expressed his concern in 1928: ‘[i]t has been our experience that where 
a corporation is dealing purely in conservative first mortgage paper, it is almost invariably the 
case that the borrower is not being pressed by his obligation, but that he has incurred other 
obligations, (...) in the form of a second mortgage (...)’.71 For Beach, while the borrower did 
not worry about paying the first mortgage as it was unamortized and would mature later, 
‘[y]ou reserve a portion of your income each month for the retirement of this second 
mortgage’.72  
This problem was not confined to urban mortgages. Although second mortgages were 
of a slightly different character in farm lands than in cities, Wickens himself insisted that: 
 
(...) the man who mortgages his land and later mortgages his crop or other 
income from the land in effect borrows twice on the same security. Not only 
does he pledge to another the income on which the first loan was based, but the 
resulting increase in his total liabilities and burden of payment reduces his 
capacity to meet all of his obligations.
73
 
 
There is also evidence that in some rare cases second mortgages were made by 
commercial banks themselves. One study comparing five North-Eastern states shows great 
variation in terms of first, second and third mortgage providers. It was carried out in 1936 on 
Home Owners’ Loan Corporation (HOLC) loans so may not be entirely representative of 
1920s loans. Nevertheless, it is striking to see that in Ohio nearly 20 per cent of the amount of 
second mortgages were provided by bank and trust companies. Individual firms provided 
around 50 per cent, while the rest was mainly provided by building and loans associations 
and financial and mortgage companies.
74
 This means that in some isolated cases commercial 
banks were affected by second mortgages not only indirectly through second mortgages' 
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 NAREB, REF, Schmidt, ‘Safeguarding’. 
71
 NAREB, REF, Adams, ‘Handling the delinquent borrower’. 
72
 NAREB, REF, Beach, ‘Financing’. See also U.S. Congress, 73rd Congress, 2nd Ses., Hearings on S.3603 
(1934). 
73
 Wickens, ‘Elements’. 
74
 Federal Home Loan Bank Board, Federal Home Loan Bank Review (1936), p. 352. The four other states 
studied were: New York, New Jersey, Connecticut and West Virginia. The numbers are similar for West 
Virginia, while for Connecticut bank and trust companies held fewer second mortgages (14%). The lowest 
shares are for New York and New Jersey, which still held around 8% of these mortgages. 
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impact on first mortgage risk, but also directly through their exposure to second mortgage 
risk.  
The scarcity of second mortgage records may have contributed to their relative 
disappearance from historical accounts. Nevertheless, soon after Hoover called second 
mortgages ‘the most backward segment of our whole credit system’75 and John Fahey 
denounced them as ‘the outstanding sore spot in the [U.S.’s] home-financing system’,76 bills 
were introduced in Congress by the Roosevelt administration not only to relieve distressed 
homeowners but also to overhaul the real estate lending system. While the Home Owners 
Loan Act of 1933 already bought first mortgages from troubled lenders and restructured them 
by extending their maturity up to 30 years and amortizing them, it was only designed as an 
emergency measure.
77
 
The National Housing Act of 1934, on the other hand, clearly aimed at the long-term 
restructuring of the mortgage financing system as a whole, and to do so primarily by 
introducing national mortgage insurance. The goal of mortgage insurance was not simply to 
increase the liquidity of real estate finance. It was in fact the main incentive structure through 
which the U.S. government hoped to make commercial banks, insurance companies and 
savings and loan institutions increasingly offer long-term (15 to 20 years), low down 
payment, monthly amortized and low interest (6 per cent) mortgages. Indeed, once the law 
was enacted, a bank could only insure its mortgages if they conformed to these criteria.
78
 The 
U.S. government thus hoped to eliminate the second mortgage system, which it successfully 
managed to do for some time. 
 
VI Conclusion 
 
A 50 per cent down payment is not easy to make for many borrowers – and indeed, more than 
two-thirds of them could not make one in the 1920s. Their solution was simple but more 
burdensome than they probably imagined at first: taking out a second, junior mortgage from 
another institution or individual. This in effect allowed them to make the required 50 per cent 
down payment, but in reality their equity in the home was only around 25 per cent. The 
interest rate on the second mortgage was usurious, maturities were shorter and more binding 
                                                          
75
 Gries and Ford, President’s conference, p. ix. 
76
 John Fahey was Chairman of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board and a key actor behind the National 
Housing Act of 1934. See Federal Home Loan Bank Board, Federal Home Loan Bank Review (1934), p. 4. His 
article is called ‘The evils of ultra-conservative lending’. 
77
 U.S. Congress, 73
rd
 Congress, 1
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 Ses., Hearings on S.1317 (1933), p.1. 
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 U.S. Congress, 73
rd
 Congress, 2
nd
 Ses., Hearings on S.3603 (1934). 
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than in the first mortgage case, which greatly impaired the borrower's ability to repay even 
the first mortgage.  
This paper presented some qualitative and empirical evidence of the extent of the 
second mortgage system and of its negative impact on commercial bank foreclosure rates. 
While some have argued to the contrary, it is likely that increased foreclosure rates would not 
have left banks completely unscathed. State banks’ exposure to real estate was significant, 
and although low LTVs would have protected them against losses, they would have been 
insufficient protection against liquidity crises. Bank runs occurred frequently in the 
Depression: high foreclosure rates and long redemption periods would have further impaired 
banks’ liquidity, and thus contributed to banking crises’ severity.  
This paper’s findings thus provide a timely reminder that debt dilution can increase 
default risk. In particular, it is noteworthy that although first mortgage contracts have 
changed considerably, the 2000s saw the re-emergence of interest-only loans combined with 
‘piggybacks’ (second mortgages). Interestingly, piggyback loans emerged in the 2000s not as 
a result of low first mortgage LTVs, but as a way for borrowers to bring down first mortgage 
LTVs to 80 per cent or below in order to avoid having to pay for private mortgage insurance. 
Mayet et al. and LaCour-Little et al. specifically documented that by 2006-7 the share of Alt-
A mortgages that were interest-only rose by 44 per cent, the share of those with piggybacks 
rose to 42 per cent, and that the share of subprime mortgages with piggybacks reached 28 per 
cent.
79
 More importantly, they found that loans with piggybacks had a significantly higher 
probability of default -- an unsurprising fact in the light of history. 
It is important to note that in this paper, increased default risk ultimately mattered 
from a liquidity point of view: long redemption periods combined with constraints on 
liabilities likely put a strain on banks, and may have contributed to the severity of the crisis. 
This added to the general problem that even good mortgage loans could not be liquidated 
easily due to long maturities, inability to be rediscounted at central banks and lack of 
secondary markets. Given particularly low LTVs, it is unlikely that banks would have made 
any significant losses on these loans. This contrasts at least partly with the recent crisis, in 
which high default rates combined with high LTVs actually could impair banks’ capital.80  
The securitization process was partly responsible for this increase in credit risk. Banks 
faced only the ‘pipeline’ risk of holding mortgages for a few months until they were passed 
                                                          
79
 Mayer et al., ‘Rise in mortgage defaults’; LaCour-Little et al., ‘What role’. 
80
 Note however that the recent crisis also saw significant increases in liquidity risk. See Bordo and Landon-
Lane, ‘Banking panics’; Gorton and Metrick, ‘Securitized banking’; Shin, ‘Reflections on Northern Rock’.  
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on to another entity.
81
 Their liquidity puts to conduits were only implicit, and when they did 
take back these entities on their balance sheets during the crisis for reputational reasons, they 
were inadequately prepared to take on those new risks – they became insolvent.82 In order for 
banks to increase the liquidity of mortgages through securitization, therefore, they need to be 
liable for the credit risk associated with them. Covered bonds are more transparent and 
constitute claims not only on the underlying assets but on the actual cash flow of the 
institution that issues them.
83
 This can significantly reduce moral hazard while still increasing 
the saleability of loans and their risk distribution to different types of investors.
84
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Figure 1. U.S. nonfarm housing starts, 1914-1933. 
Source: Carter et al, Historical statistics, Series Dc-510.  
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Figure 2. Estimated real estate loans by type of bank (all categories), 1900-1938 ($ million) 
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, All Bank Statistics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Estimated main asset holdings at state banks, 1900-1938 ($ million, stacked) 
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, All bank statistics. 
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Figure 4. Deposits at national and state commercial banks, 1900-1938 ($ million) 
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, All Bank Statistics. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. LTV in 1927 and percentage of foreclosures started on loans existing on January 
1st, 1934. 
Source: Wickens, Financial survey.  
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Figure 6. LTV in 1928 and percentage of foreclosures started on loans existing on January 
1st, 1934. 
Source: Wickens, Financial survey. 
 
 
Figure 7. LTVs in 1927 and 1928 and all homeowner income in 1929 ($).  
Source: Wickens, Financial survey. 
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Figure 8. LTVs in 1927 and 1928 and fall in property values, 1926-34 (%).  
Source: Wickens, Financial survey. 
 
 
Figure 9. Percentage of foreclosures started on loans existing on January 1st, 1934 and 
percentage fall in property values between 1926 and January 1st, 1934. 
Source: Wickens, Financial survey.   
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Figure 10. LTVs in 1927 and 1928 and contract interest rates. 
Source: Wickens, Financial survey.  
 
 
 
 
Table 1. Redemption laws and urban LTVs by state, 1928 and 1920-1929 
 
 
     
State  Redemption period, 
in months (1928) 
 Commercial bank 
urban LTV (1920-
1929) 
     
     
Alabama  24  - 
Alaska  6  - 
Arizona  12  - 
Arkansas  6  44 
California  6  - 
Colorado  0  47 
Connecticut  0  - 
Delaware  0  38 
D.C.  -  - 
Florida  0  55 
Georgia  0  50 
Idaho  12  44 
Illinois  12  48 
Indiana  12  - 
Iowa  12  46 
Kansas  18  - 
Kentucky  0  - 
Louisiana  12  40 
Maine  0  56 
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Maryland  0  57 
Massachusetts  12  46 
Michigan  12  44 
Minnesota  0  - 
Mississippi  12  63 
Montana  12  - 
Nebraska  9  - 
Nevada  6  - 
New Hampshire  0  - 
New Jersey  0  48 
New Mexico  9  - 
New York  0  55 
North Carolina  0  - 
North Dakota  12  - 
Ohio  0  50 
Oklahoma  -  40 
Oregon  4  - 
Pennsylvania  0  53 
Rhode Island  0  53 
South Carolina  0  53 
South Dakota  12  - 
Tennessee  24  39 
Texas  0  50 
Utah  6  - 
Vermont  12  - 
Virginia  0  48 
Washington  12  47 
West Virginia  0  49 
Wisconsin  12  - 
Wyoming  6  - 
     
Notes: The data on redemption laws are taken from Jones, Treatise. The data on LTVs by state are taken from 
the same NBER database as in Morton, Urban mortgage lending, used to derive his averages, mentioned above. 
As pointed out earlier, these data are to be taken with great care as they come from a survey, made only in 1945, 
of commercial banks which by definition survived the Great Depression. As Morton himself insists, banks were 
less likely to report accurately on loans made twenty years earlier than on more recent loans (see Morton, Urban 
mortgage lending, p. 133-8). I thank Andra Ghent for making these data available to me in a processed format. 
The raw data are available online on the NBER website: 
http://www.nber.org/nberhistory/historicalarchives/archives.html. 
 
 
Table 2. First and second mortgage loan characteristics 
 
       
Loan characteristics  First mortgage  Second mortgage  Combined 
       
       
Contract maturity  3-5 years
a,c,d 
 ‘Shorter’c,f ,1-3 yearsb,c  - 
Loan-to-value ratio (%)  40
b
 to 54
e,d
  20
b,d
 to 29
e
  75
c
 to 83
e
 
Annual interest rate (%)  5 to 7
a,c 
 14 to 16 or above
b,c
  - 
Renewal expectations  Yes
a,g 
 No
f 
 - 
Monthly principal payments  No
a,c 
 Yes
c,f
  - 
       
 
Notes: When discussing first mortgage lending, many of these sources do not refer specifically to commercial 
banks per se. Rather, they refer to companies which, unlike B&Ls, offered only straight mortgages. We know 
from Morton that commercial banks were in this category (see Morton, Urban mortgage lending, p. 3-7, 178). 
This category also included so-called ‘mortgage companies,’ which specialized in mortgage lending.   
Sources: 
a
 Morton, Urban mortgage lending, pp. 3-7, 178. 
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b
 NAREB, REF, Dunton, ‘Cost of financing,’ p. 172-3,177.  
c 
Gries and Ford, President’s conference, p.6, 16, 17, 20. 
d NAREB, REF, Adair, ‘Housing loans,’ p. 54. 
e NAREB, ‘Financing the American home.’ 
f NAREB, REF, Beach, ‘Financing above the first mortgage,’ p. 2.  
g
 Reep, Second mortgages, p. xx. 
 
 
Table 3. OLS model of foreclosure rates, 1927-1934 (dependent variable: foreclosurerate) 
 
       
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
       
LTV1927 -.078*** -.104** -.072**    
 (.02) (.04) (.03)    
LTV1928    -.067*** -.066*** -.059*** 
    (.02) (.02) (.02) 
income  -.001   .000  
  (.001)   (.00)  
valuefall   -.023   -.036 
   (.02)   (.04) 
constant 6.219 11.722 5.296 5.670 4.917 4.292 
 (1.34) (5.37) (2.01) (.90) (2.83) (1.54) 
       
       
n 14 14 14 16 16 16 
R
2 
.43 .53 .45 .42 .43 .44 
Prob > F .006 .019 .017 .001 .001 .006 
       
 
Notes: *** significant at α = 0.01, ** significant at α = 0.05, * significant at α = 0.10. The dependent variable is 
foreclosurerate: the rate of foreclosure on first mortgages made by commercial banks (%). LTV is first mortgage 
LTV made by commercial banks in 1927 and 1928 (%); income is the 1929 income of all surveyed homeowners 
in owner-occupied dwellings ($). valuefall is the percentage fall in owner-occupied home values from 1926 to 
January 1
st
, 1934 (%). Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Source: Wickens, Financial survey.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
37 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 
 
 
Table 4. Redemption laws and foreclosure practice by state, 1925 
       
       
State  Suit in court  Redemption period  Total approximate 
time to get title 
       
       
Alabama  No   2 years  psd + 2 years 
Alaska  -  -  - 
Arizona  Yes  6 months  court time + 6 
months 
Arkansas  Yes  1 year w  court time 
California  Yes  1 year  court time + 1 year 
10 months 
Colorado  No   9 months  court time 
Connecticut  Yes  -  court time 
Delaware  Yes  -  court time 
D.C.  -  -  - 
Florida  Yes   -  court time 
Georgia  Yes  -  court time 
Idaho  Yes  1 year  court time + 1 year 
Illinois  Yes  15 months  court time + 15 
months 
Indiana  Yes  1 year  court time + 1 year 
Iowa  Yes  1 year  court time + 1 year 
Kansas  Yes  18 months  court time + 18 
months 
38 
 
Kentucky  Yes  1 year 2/3av  court time 
Louisiana  No  -   50 days 
Maine  No  -   1 year 
Maryland  No  -  psd + confirmation of 
sale by court 
Massachusetts  No  -  21 days 
Michigan  No  1 year  15 months 
Minnesota  No  1 year  13.5 months 
Mississippi  No  No  21 days 
Missouri  No  -  20 days 
Montana  Yes  1 year  court time + 1 year 
Nebraska  Yes  9 months  court time + 9 
months 
Nevada  Yes  6 months  court time + 6 
months 
New Hampshire  No  1 year  1 year 
New Jersey  Yes  -  court time 
New Mexico  Yes  3 months  court time + 1 year 
New York  Yes  -  court time 
North Carolina  No  -  psd + 10 days 
North Dakota  No  1 year  14.5 months 
Ohio  Yes  -   court time 
Oklahoma  Yes  6 months  court time + 6 
months 
Oregon  Yes  1 year  court time + 1 year 
Pennsylvania  Yes  1 year w  court time 
Rhode Island  No  -  psd 
South Carolina  Yes  -  court time 
South Dakota  No  1 year  13.5 months 
Tennessee  No  2 years w  psd 
Texas  No  -  20 days 
Utah  Yes  6 months  court time + 6 
months 
Vermont  Yes  1 yea  court time + 1 year 
Virginia  No  -  psd 
Washington  Yes  1 year  court time + 1 year 
West Virginia  No  -   20 days 
Wisconsin  Yes  1 year  court time + 1 year 
Wyoming  No  9 months  10.5 months 
       
 
Notes: ``psd'' - power of sale days; ``w'' - period may be waived in the mortgage; ``2/3av'' - 
redemption allowed only if property does not sell for 2/3 appraised value. 
Source: Child, ‘Uniform mortgage law.’  
 
 
 
Table 5. Legal interest rates on mortgages and statutory maximums by state, 1928 
 
     
     
State  Legal rate (%)  Statutory maximum 
(%) 
     
     
Alabama  8  8 
Alaska  6  10 
Arizona  6  10 
Arkansas  6  10 
California  7  12 
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Colorado  8  No limit 
Connecticut  6  12 
Delaware  6  6 
D.C.  6  10 
Florida  8  10 
Georgia  7  8 
Idaho  7  10 
Illinois  5  7 
Indiana  6  8 
Iowa  6  8 
Kansas  6  10 
Kentucky  6  6 
Louisiana  5  8 
Maine  6  No limit 
Maryland  6  6 
Massachusetts  6  No limit 
Michigan  5  7 
Minnesota  6  8 
Mississippi  6  8 
Missouri  6  8 
Montana  8  12 
Nebraska  7  10 
Nevada  7  No limit 
New Hampshire  6  No limit 
New Jersey  6  6 
New Mexico  6  12 
New York  6  6 
North Carolina  6  6 
North Dakota  6  10 
Ohio  6  8 
Oklahoma  6  10 
Oregon  6  10 
Pennsylvania  6  6 
Rhode Island  6  30 
South Carolina  7  8 
South Dakota  7  12 
Tennessee  6  6 
Texas  6  10 
Utah  8  12 
Vermont  6  6 
Virginia  6  6 
Washington  6  12 
West Virginia  6  6 
Wisconsin  6  10 
Wyoming  8  12 
     
 
Sources: Reep, Second mortgages, pp. 215-7. 
 
 
 
Figure 11 shows that the strongest correlations between the average original amount of 
existing first mortgage and the average amount of existing loans contracted or renewed in 
some particular years can be found in 1927 and 1928. This suggests that a focus on LTVS for 
loans made in those years is recommended, given that the data on foreclosure rates are not 
broken-up by year loan made but are average foreclosure rates for existing loans.  
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Figure 11. Original amount of existing loan and amount of existing loan contracted or 
renewed in 1925, 1926, 1927 and 1928 ($).  
Source: Wickens, Survey of urban housing.  
 
 
 
Figure 12. 1933 income ($) of homeowners in owner-occupied dwellings, free of mortgage 
and mortgaged, with error bars. 
Source: Wickens, Survey of urban housing.  
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Figure 13. All homeowner income in 1929 and borrower income in 1933 ($). 
Source: Wickens, Survey of urban housing.  
 
 
 
Figure 14. Kernel density plot of residuals for regressions (1) to (6).  
Source: Wickens, Survey of urban housing.  
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Online Appendix 
 
Table S.1. Redemption laws and foreclosure practice by state, 1925 
       
       
State  Suit in court  Redemption period  Total approximate 
time to get title 
       
       
Alabama  No   2 years  psd + 2 years 
Alaska  -  -  - 
Arizona  Yes  6 months  court time + 6 
months 
Arkansas  Yes  1 year w  court time 
California  Yes  1 year  court time + 1 year 
10 months 
Colorado  No   9 months  court time 
Connecticut  Yes  0  court time 
Delaware  Yes  0  court time 
D.C.  -  -  - 
Florida  Yes   0  court time 
Georgia  Yes  0  court time 
Idaho  Yes  1 year  court time + 1 year 
Illinois  Yes  15 months  court time + 15 
months 
Indiana  Yes  1 year  court time + 1 year 
Iowa  Yes  1 year  court time + 1 year 
Kansas  Yes  18 months  court time + 18 
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months 
Kentucky  Yes  1 year 2/3av  court time 
Louisiana  No  0   50 days 
Maine  No  0   1 year 
Maryland  No  0  psd + confirmation of 
sale by court 
Massachusetts  No  0  21 days 
Michigan  No  1 year  15 months 
Minnesota  No  1 year  13.5 months 
Mississippi  No  No  21 days 
Missouri  No  0  20 days 
Montana  Yes  1 year  court time + 1 year 
Nebraska  Yes  9 months  court time + 9 
months 
Nevada  Yes  6 months  court time + 6 
months 
New Hampshire  No  1 year  1 year 
New Jersey  Yes  0  court time 
New Mexico  Yes  3 months  court time + 1 year 
New York  Yes  0  court time 
North Carolina  No  0  psd + 10 days 
North Dakota  No  1 year  14.5 months 
Ohio  Yes  0   court time 
Oklahoma  Yes  6 months  court time + 6 
months 
Oregon  Yes  1 year  court time + 1 year 
Pennsylvania  Yes  1 year w  court time 
Rhode Island  No  0  psd 
South Carolina  Yes  0  court time 
South Dakota  No  1 year  13.5 months 
Tennessee  No  2 years w  psd 
Texas  No  0  20 days 
Utah  Yes  6 months  court time + 6 
months 
Vermont  Yes  1 year  court time + 1 year 
Virginia  No  0  psd 
Washington  Yes  1 year  court time + 1 year 
West Virginia  No  0   20 days 
Wisconsin  Yes  1 year  court time + 1 year 
Wyoming  No  9 months  10.5 months 
       
 
Notes: ``psd'' - power of sale days; ``w'' - period may be waived in the mortgage; ``2/3av'' - 
redemption allowed only if property does not sell for 2/3 appraised value. 
Source: Child, ‘Uniform mortgage law.’  
 
 
 
Table S.2. Legal interest rates on mortgages and statutory maximums by state, 1928 
 
     
     
State  Legal rate (%)  Statutory maximum 
(%) 
     
     
Alabama  8  8 
Alaska  6  10 
Arizona  6  10 
Arkansas  6  10 
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California  7  12 
Colorado  8  No limit 
Connecticut  6  12 
Delaware  6  6 
D.C.  6  10 
Florida  8  10 
Georgia  7  8 
Idaho  7  10 
Illinois  5  7 
Indiana  6  8 
Iowa  6  8 
Kansas  6  10 
Kentucky  6  6 
Louisiana  5  8 
Maine  6  No limit 
Maryland  6  6 
Massachusetts  6  No limit 
Michigan  5  7 
Minnesota  6  8 
Mississippi  6  8 
Missouri  6  8 
Montana  8  12 
Nebraska  7  10 
Nevada  7  No limit 
New Hampshire  6  No limit 
New Jersey  6  6 
New Mexico  6  12 
New York  6  6 
North Carolina  6  6 
North Dakota  6  10 
Ohio  6  8 
Oklahoma  6  10 
Oregon  6  10 
Pennsylvania  6  6 
Rhode Island  6  30 
South Carolina  7  8 
South Dakota  7  12 
Tennessee  6  6 
Texas  6  10 
Utah  8  12 
Vermont  6  6 
Virginia  6  6 
Washington  6  12 
West Virginia  6  6 
Wisconsin  6  10 
Wyoming  8  12 
     
 
Source: Reep, Second mortgages, pp. 215-7. 
 
Figure S.1 shows that the strongest correlations between the average original amount of 
existing first mortgage and the average amount of existing loans contracted or renewed in 
some particular years can be found in 1927 and 1928. This suggests that a focus on LTVS for 
loans made in those years is recommended, given that the data on foreclosure rates are not 
broken-up by year loan made but are average foreclosure rates for existing loans.  
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Figure S.1. Original amount of existing loan and amount of existing loan contracted or 
renewed in 1925, 1926, 1927 and 1928 ($).  
Source: Wickens, Survey of urban housing. For more detail, see text.  
 
 
 
Figure S.2. 1933 income ($) of homeowners in owner-occupied dwellings, free of mortgage 
and mortgaged, with error bars. 
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Source: Wickens, Survey of urban housing. For more detail, see text.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure S.3. All homeowner income in 1929 and borrower income in 1933 ($). 
Source: Wickens, Survey of urban housing. For more detail, see text.  
 
 
 
Figure S.4. Kernel density plot of residuals for regressions (1) to (6).  
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Source: Wickens, Survey of urban housing. For more detail, see text.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
